GLOBAL CULTURAL GOVERNANCE.
DECISION-MAKING CONCERNING WORLD HERITAGE
BETWEEN POLITICS AND SCIENCE

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With 5 figures, 2 tables and 1 photo
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Summary: The issue of heritage has become fashionable in the cultural sciences, with UNESCO’s World Heritage programme attracting a great deal of academic attention. However, there has been no social study of the global level of World Heritage governance, which can be seen as an example of global cultural governance – societal governance and regulation of cultural expressions and cultural orientation systems. This paper first discusses the concept of cultural governance as an approach for social and cultural sciences and applies it to the specific case of World Heritage. Empirically, the paper is based essentially on an observation of two sessions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee in 2006 and 2007. It is shown that within the Committee, and to a certain extent also within UNESCO’s official advisory bodies, there are different understandings of key concepts (such as outstanding universal value) and key instruments (such as World Heritage List in Danger, benchmarks); however, this pluralism need not necessarily be detrimental to the successful governance of World Heritage properties. The practice of decision-making on the basis of “far-fetched facts” is a problem for the credibility of the global institutions in multilevel governance systems or international regimes.


Keywords: Cultural governance, global governance, World Heritage, UNESCO, international organization

1 Introduction: towards a cultural geography of world heritage

It seems to be fashionable today in the social and cultural sciences to discuss issues relating to cultural heritage. As to the reasons for this increased academic interest in heritage, one could plausibly assume that it reflects a greater social interest in the topic. The latter would then appear to be a reaction to the acceleration of globalization and modernization phenomena in the past ten to fifteen years, in which the particular, in other words the local, is at risk of being lost and replaced by globally standardized architectures and consumer cultures (cf. AUGÉ 1992). According to this interpretation, the current interest in heritage is the continuation of an older tradition. It was self-reflection on the part of societies that perceived themselves as being in a situation of great upheaval that led to the “invention” of cultural heritage and the institutionalization of the protection of historic monuments in Europe, following the iconoclasm of the French Revolution (cf. CHOAY 1997). But the current interest in heritage may also be due to other factors. These include a discursive event that has been much discussed in the cultural sciences: the adoption in 2003 of the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, a kind of sister convention to the World Heritage Convention of 1972 (SCHMITT 2008). And in the last ten years there has been a clear shift of focus in the cultural sciences literature on heritage, with new approaches being

Much of this academic attention is devoted to UNESCO’s World Heritage programme, which is understandable for several reasons. For the general public, UNESCO’s World Heritage List serves as a reference for what is worth preserving for future generations. The international organization UNESCO and its official advisory bodies can be understood as important global standard setters in questions of safeguarding cultural and natural heritage, whose recommendations and concepts are taken up by other actors. Although numerous studies have been devoted to UNESCO’s World Heritage programme, one aspect has largely been neglected: the global level of World Heritage governance. Academics generally prefer to work on heritage in local contexts, and they frequently share with the local actors they study a feeling that the global level of World Heritage governance is an important factor for local concerns, but that it is something about which little is known. Many speculations and claims are made in respect of the mechanisms of World Heritage governance on the global level, as can be observed not only in local research contexts but also at academic conferences, but few of these claims are backed up by empirical evidence. On the other hand, active “insiders” who publish papers on World Heritage do this as a rule in accordance with their role and function, so that the resulting papers are only partially helpful.

In this article I will try to open the “black box” of World Heritage governance, and – as far as this is possible within the space available – to throw some light on the internal processes of World Heritage governance at the global level, going beyond what is presented in official accounts, and concentrating on one particular case study. The issue of global World Heritage governance will be discussed in terms of the broader approach to cultural governance presented in section 2. This approach promises to be fruitful for other research areas in cultural geography and cultural studies. The methodological background is presented in section 3, followed in section 4 by an approach to the global decision-making level of World Heritage governance.

2 Cultural governance as a research approach in cultural sciences and cultural geography

The cultural governance approach presented here is concerned with the social actors, mechanisms, conditions and modes of regulation of the social production of “culture”, i.e. of cultural and artistic forms of expression, symbols and collective sense and meaning. Thus, it approaches the cultural from the perspective of the social sciences (cf. Cappai 2001, especially for cultural geography for instance Lippuner 2005, Werlen 2003). The reconstruction of variously conceived relations between orientation systems, social and economic structures, and social and political action, has been a central preoccupation of the social sciences since Karl Marx and Max Weber; it is specified by the cultural governance approach outlined in this paper. The Frankfurt School, with its reflections on mass culture, the so-called cultural industry (Horkheimer and Adorno 1969, orig. 1947) and the mutual relations between “culture and administration” (Adorno 1972, orig. 1960), and also British Cultural Studies with its work on the regulation of cultural artefacts (Thompson 1997) can be points of reference in reflections on cultural governance. To date, the notion of cultural governance has mainly appeared in works which can be associated with post-colonialism and which discuss the cultural representation and cultural suppression of so-called indigenous societies by European colonial powers and with the governance of cultural diversity (cf. Shapiro 2004, also Campbell 2003, 57).

The concept of governance has been widespread in the social sciences since the 1990s. Young (1997, 4) offers the following definition: “At the most general level, governance involves the establishment and operation of social institutions – in other words, sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and programmatic activities that serve to define social practices and to guide the interactions of those participating in these practices”. It is well known that the concept of governance was developed in opposition to government in the classical sense of top-down regulation (Rosenau 1992). According to its own definition, the more open concept of governance can include this kind of classical government as a particular mode of governance. We need to distinguish the following dimensions of the concept of governance:

- the sectoral dimension or the issue-orientation of governance, as expressed in terms such as environmental governance, risk governance or cultural governance
- the structural dimension, which means the institutional framework, the major institutions, recognized rules and organizations in the governance field
- the processual dimension, which is concerned with the manner of political negotiation and control (such as government, top-down regulation, or negotiation in accordance with Habermas’ ideal of communicative action)
- the dimension of scale, or reconstruction of the control of issues by actors and institutions, which can be attributed to various scales with in the social space (as
in global governance, urban governance), where actors from different scales interact with each other (multilevel governance, cf. Benz 2007), possibly influenced by differing, scale-specific political interpretation cultures

- The normative dimension in which the different kinds of governance processes and outcomes are assessed normatively, according to general principles (participation, justice, transparency, legitimation, accountability, equal representation).

At first glance, cultural governance appears to be no different from any other sectoral field of governance, such as environmental governance. However, in view of the high number of different understandings of culture (see for instance Reckwitz 2004) in the social and cultural sciences, it must be asked what is meant here by “cultural”. Academic disciplines are obviously no longer in a position to define their central concepts conclusively and in broad consensus with the scientific community, or they can do so only in relation to specific paradigms; but at least they should be prepared to wrestle with their central concepts. In a narrow sense, cultural governance could be said to relate to the political negotiations about established cultural institutions or cultural forms, such as theatre, music or opera, and to the control, the societal production and definition of cultural heritage (Fig. 1). More broadly conceived concepts of cultural governance were aimed at the (self-)regulation of the so-called “cultural industry” (cf. Horkheimer and Adorno 1969, orig. 1947), in other words at the manner of interaction of market, cultural economy, mass taste and cultural production, which is also a favoured subject in British Cultural Studies. The concept of cultural governance can also be used to mean measures taken by the state (for instance repressive measures) in respect of cultural forms of expression, symbols and cultural orientation systems of minorities, and especially of suppressed ethnic groups or noncomformist subcultures. Other social subsystems, such as the economy, also produce their own value structures and symbols; their (society-wide) influence, and their attempts at cultural hegemony within society can also be subsumed under cultural governance. The reconstruction of a concrete cultural governance structure has to consider the fundamental signifying practices, the representations and the modes of consumption of the cultural object, and also its relevancy for the identity of individuals, social groups and societies. Insofar, the cultural governance approach presented here is in line with the “Circuit of Culture”-concept in Thompson (1997)

Social negotiation and control of the production of social sense and meaning, cultural orientation systems and their symbols, and cultural and artistic forms of expression, is thus central to the cultural governance approach. This approach occupies a unique position in comparison with other sectoral forms of governance, such as environmental governance. This argument can be justified on three levels: (1) Not only those objects of governance designated as cultural, but also the forms of governance themselves, reproduce or are influenced by norms and thus by cultural orientation systems. Putting it in plain terms (and thus admittedly imprecisely), we can say that a “governanced culture” is opposed to a “culture of governance” (see also Hall 1997). The norms and references of the regulated cultural forms of expression and the dominating norms of the governance system may be congruent or complementary, but may also be completely different or even diametrically opposed. It can be assumed that the manner of this relationship leaves neither the cultural forms of expression nor the regulating system of governance unchanged. In respect of cultural heritage, this aspect is especially relevant with regard to the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. (2) Governance approaches not infrequently confront existing forms of social control with normative standards that need to be met, such as participation, accountability, etc. The categories applied in the case of academic observation of social phenomena of course also refer to cultural orientation systems, which must be appropriately reflected on as part of the academic work process. (3) In semiotically influenced approaches used in cultural studies, “culture” or “sense” and “meaning” often appear as the result of operations in which a meaning and thus sense are attributed to codes, signs and symbols. But “sense” also has a further, existential dimension: a performance, a poem, a ritual, or the sight of a cultural landscape, may, in certain circumstances, touch a person in an existential manner. This existential personal experience of sense (even though fleeting and tied to a particular moment) evades any clear external control, but it is potentially also relevant for society. Large parts of cultural production are not aimed at communicating existential sense. Repressive governance mechanisms are aimed at preventing the self-determined experience of sense. The concept of cultural governance is thus also concerned with the social “availability” and plurality of existential sense or its suppression, according to Galtung’s (1996) concept of “cultural violence”.

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ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES ARE OBVIOUSLY NO LONGER IN A POSITION TO DEFINE THEIR CENTRAL CONCEPTS CONCLUSIVELY AND IN BROAD CONSENSUS WITH THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY, OR THEY CAN DO SO ONLY IN RELATION TO SPECIFIC PARADIGMS; BUT AT LEAST THEY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO WRESTLE WITH THEIR CENTRAL CONCEPTS.
The 1972 World Heritage Convention (more precisely: Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage) constitutes an important reference example of international cultural governance in the form of an international regime and a special type of multilevel governance. The object of its governance includes cultural and urban landscapes (and nature reserves), all of which are long-established subjects of research in geography. The World Heritage Convention provides a legal blueprint for the interaction of the institutions involved, for the governance structure. But the decision-making processes concerning World Heritage governance cannot be reconstructed by studying publicly available UNESCO documents only. For this purpose, it is necessary to observe concrete decision practices.

The key questions in this part of the paper are the following: what are the framework conditions today for World Heritage governance and its global production of sense and meaning? How are essential decisions arrived at concerning the World Heritage List and global governance of World Heritage Sites? What problems are likely to occur in a multi-level governance system in which a committee has to judge situations in distant places? Is it possible to distinguish different “governance cultures” in respect of World Heritage?

Within the discipline of International Relations (IR), there was an initial phase of deep interest in international organizations from the 1950s to the 1970s. An important reference point in this first phase of research into international organizations was the collection of articles *The Anatomy of Influence* by Cox and Jacobson (1973) on decision-making processes in international organizations. The reconstruction of decision-making processes presented in Cox and Jacobson (1973) was based in particular on the analysis of documents and records of meetings, and in some cases on interviews with actors. A conceivable further development of the approach used in Cox and Jacobson (1973) for the empirical study of decision-making processes in international institutions, using ethnographic approaches, did not at first take place (but see also Blatter et al. 2007).

Loosely borrowing Goffmann’s (1969) distinction between stage and backstage, I would like to distinguish three levels of representation of World Heritage governance: the various fronts or display windows, the internal semi-public arenas, and the backrooms.

**Fronts/display windows:** I use the term display windows to refer to those areas of World Heritage governance which are accessible to the public and which as a rule are medially transmitted. The display windows contain those publications by UNESCO and closely related organizations and cooperation partners (such as *National Geographic*) that are aimed at a broad public around the world (Fig. 3), or the quarterly journal *World Heritage*. The problems and dangers facing World Heritage Sites are also displayed in this window, but set off by success stories and proofs of the effectiveness of global mechanisms for protection of the sites.

**Internal arenas:** The most important internal arenas of World Heritage governance are the annual sessions of the World Heritage Committee, at which
central decisions are made, for instance concerning additions to the World Heritage List. These sessions are not public in a formal sense, but take place in the presence of a large number of observers, including representatives of non-governmental organizations. They can thus be described as semi-public.

**Backrooms:** The important decisions in respect of World Heritage governance are made, as mentioned above, on a semi-public stage. However, these decisions are necessarily prepared and prestructured, for instance by means of drafts produced by the UNESCO administration and advisory bodies. Attempts are also made to influence the decisions of the Committee by various lobby groups including NGOs. It must be emphasized that although these preliminary consultations can influence what takes place in the semi-public arena of the World Heritage Committee, they can in no way predetermine the results – there may always be a moment of surprise in the sessions, a surprising result, a clash of diverging interests and positions, and expressions of necessary and creative freedom.

A first, “thin” description of the global institutions of World Heritage Governance will precede the “thick” description (in the sense of Geertz 1983) of the interplay of these institutions.

On a global level, the governance of World Heritage consists of the interaction and reciprocal balance of several institutions. The most important decision-making body is the World Heritage Committee which is composed of representatives from 21 countries. The members of the Committee are re-elected at regular intervals by the General Assembly of the States Parties of the World Heritage Convention on the sidelines of the UNESCO General Assembly. The World Heritage Committee makes decisions concerning the inscription of sites on the World Heritage List and the World Heritage List in Danger, or their deletion. In addition, it can for instance urge national governments and local authorities to implement corrective measures to remedy certain deficiencies at World Heritage Sites, or it can provide financial or material aid or expertise if requested.

The World Heritage Committee is mainly advised by ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites) and IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources); the advisory role of these institutions is anchored in the text of the Convention (see UNESCO 1972, Art. 8, 3; Art. 13, 7). As part of the UNESCO administration, the UNESCO World Heritage Centre acts as secretariat for the World Heritage Committee, in accordance with the text of the Convention, and in practice it also provides the Committee with information and advice. The “counterparts” of the World Heritage Committee, in the sense of the addressees of most of its decisions, are the governments of the countries concerned. It is they who nominate possible sites for the World Heritage List, and it is to them that the Committee turns if it hears of problems at their World Heritage Sites.

Besides my research on several different World Heritage Sites, this paper is essentially based on my observation of two one-week sessions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee which I attended with the formal status of an observer. These were the 30th ordinary session of the Committee in 2006 in Vilnius, Lithuania, and the 31st session in 2007 in Christchurch, New Zealand. In addition to observing the plenary discussions, I was able to hold many informal conversations, and in certain cases interviews, with delegates, UNESCO staff and other observers during the sessions. In 2004 and 2007 I spent several days at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris for research purposes. I have also held conversations and interviews in North Africa and Central Europe with former participants and observers of sessions of the World Heritage Committee. In addition, this paper is also based on my own analyses of many UNESCO documents (including conference documents).

Social scientists, as a result of their professional conditioning, tend to direct their attention in the research process towards conflicts, breaches, contradictions and inconsistencies. This focusing on conflicts may be motivated by their particular social relevance, but may also be an important methodological principle for qualitative social researchers, as is the case in this paper; for the underlying mechanisms and processes of a social interaction system are often more clearly revealed through conflicts, breaches, contradictions and inconsistencies than through undisturbed normal routines. In this way they can be more easily studied, despite the fact that action patterns and orientations in a conflict or crisis may differ from the routine patterns (Willke 2006, 123). For this methodological reason, I will concentrate particularly in this paper on the conflictive debates that took place at the 2006 session of the Committee, rather than on one the much more common conflict-free, or less conflict-loaded, debates, during which the World Heritage Committee earnestly and successfully strove to achieve optimum protection for a World Heritage Site.
4 Global World Heritage governance observed

4.1 The external framework

Sessions of the World Heritage Committee last about a week and are highly ritualized and formalized. There is always a long agenda which has to be got through within a very tight time frame. The conference rooms are clearly zoned: in the middle of the platform sits the chairperson, who is selected from among the committee members, and next to him or her as a rule the Director of the UNESCO World Heritage Centre; on either side of these two sit representatives of the advisory bodies and as a rule other UNESCO officials, varying according to the agenda items. In the rows in front of the platform sit the delegations which are members of the Committee, and behind them the observer groups (for instance representatives of other countries or NGOs), who as a rule have no right to speak (Photo 1). The roles appear to be clearly distributed among the chairperson, committee members, UNESCO officials and advisory bodies; the time allowed to each speaker is narrowly limited and as a rule is two minutes for a statement by a delegation. Five whole minutes are allowed to the advisory bodies for oral presentation of a potential new World Heritage Site and an evaluation of the nomination proposal from their own point of view. In 2007 it was accepted that the ICOMOS representative needed ten minutes for the presentation of large and complex sites. In addition to the oral presentations, the delegates receive in advance written documents, which in the case of the evaluation of nomination proposals consist of about six to ten pages of text per site. As a rule such reports are followed by a draft decision prepared by the advisory bodies or the UNESCO World Heritage Centre, which serves as a basis for the discussion. The tight time frame assumes that many decisions will be made by the Committee without any discussion, or after a short discussion of only a few minutes, in other words that the draft decision will be adopted largely unchanged. On the other hand, as a body having sovereign control over the World Heritage List and the everyday business of World Heritage governance, it is part of the Committee’s self-image that it does not accept every draft decision without comment, but discusses alternative proposals. If the discussion on one site lasts considerably longer than half an hour — as hap-

![Photo 1: Arrangement of the 30th session of the World Heritage Committee in Vilnius (July 2006)](image)

![Fig. 2: Number of World Heritage Sites inscribed over time](chart)
pened in 2006/2007 for the existing World Heritage sites of Cologne Cathedral, Dresden Elbe Valley and Tipasa, Algeria, for instance – then this is a remarkable exception and almost inevitably leads to modification of the time schedule.

Institutionally, global World Heritage governance is shaped by the procedures and settings of international diplomacy; Titchen (1995, 3) speaks of a “distinctive style of international heritage protection diplomacy” which has developed since the entry into force of the Convention. At first glance, global governance of the material artefacts of cultural diversity is organized according to the rules of an emerging global metaculture, of a world society in the sense of the Stanford school (cf. Meyer 2005).

From its beginning at the end of the 1970s up to the present, World Heritage governance has undergone a transformation which can be aptly described as increasing professionalization, scientificization, bureaucratization and also NGOization. In recent years, the number of World Heritage Sites has increased at the rate of about twenty to thirty per year (Fig. 2).

Critics sometimes argue that this will lead to the World Heritage List losing its exclusivity and its immediate evidence; defenders of this policy point out that a greater number of important sites can thus enjoy the protection of the World Heritage Convention and the international community. In view of the fact that the resources (staff, time, material resources) available to the global actors involved in UNESCO World Heritage governance, including the Committee, remain fairly constant, and since the number of sites is increasing by about twenty or thirty every year, it is obvious that the actors on the global level of World Heritage governance can pay less and less attention to any individual site.

The number of participants at sessions of the World Heritage Committee, including observers, has significantly increased in the 1990s and 2000s, and this has also changed the character of the sessions. Around 1980 their number was less than 100; today the number has levelled out at a total of 600 or 800 (Fig. 3). This increase in the number of participants may be seen as the reflection of a new respect for international organizations and global forms of governance, besides the special esteem in which the World Heritage List is held, and, in the case of the NGOs, a widespread need to be linked with these global institutions. Due to the rapid growth and increasing ease and affordability of international air...
travel, together with the availability of information on international conferences via the Internet, such conferences have become more easily accessible to potentially interested people – structural moments, in the sense defined by GIDDENS (1984), which have effected considerable changes in the global governance of the World Heritage regime. The growing scientification and professionalization of World Heritage governance also finds expression in many analyses carried out by the advisory bodies and the UNESCO administration, which bear witness to an intensive self-observation of the international regime (cf. i.e. ICOMOS 2005).

There are noticeable differences among the participants in respect of their previous knowledge, and sometimes also in respect of their interpretation of the key concepts and instruments of the World Heritage Convention. The sessions sometimes have a kind of pedagogical subtext which enlightens delegates about the concepts, norms and instruments they are expected to apply. This observation is in line with the assumptions of (Historical) Neo-Institutionalism, according to which international institutions do not a priori reflect the fixed preferences of national states, but on the contrary have a socializing effect and are thus able to change positions, preferences and identities of national state actors (cf. Risse 2003; Hall and Taylor 1996).

4.2 The key concept of outstanding universal value (o.u.v.) and the cultural geographies of World Heritage in the global arena

The World Heritage List is at the core of the metacultural production of symbols for an emerging world society. ALOIS RIEGL (1929, orig. 1903), a theoretician of the preservation of monuments, was aware avant la lettre of the socially constructed character of cultural heritage and the manner in which it is selected in accordance with specific present-day needs (cf. Wohlleben 1988, 27). According to the World Heritage Convention, monuments, landscapes and sites inscribed on the World Heritage List have to meet the criterion of outstanding universal value (UNESCO 1972, Art. 11), a term which was obviously chosen rather fortuitously during the genesis of the Convention (cf. Ritchén 1995).

Differing interpretations of key concepts in the World Heritage Convention can be observed in the Committee sessions and not just occasionally, for instance when newcomers among the delegates express surprising opinions. The two advisory bodies, IUCN (for natural heritage) and ICOMOS (for cultural heritage), represent divergent positions with regard to the key concept of outstanding universal value (Table 1); this dispute is obvious in the semi-public arena of the World Heritage Committee, but not in the “windows” publications on World Heritage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IUCN</th>
<th>ICOMOS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tends to adopt positions of empirical realism</td>
<td>Tends towards social constructivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.u.v. (*) of a site can be determined objectively.</td>
<td>O.u.v. of a site is socially constructed. Perceptions of what has o. u. v. can vary over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.u.v. concerns only “global superlatives”.</td>
<td>Sites to which o.u.v. is attributed must not necessarily be superlative. Otherwise this could mean that greater value is implicitly attributed to certain cultures than to others.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Possible sites (such as mountain areas) are compared with other sites of the same type all over the world and must pass the test of o.u.v. in comparison with them.</td>
<td>Possible sites (such as historic towns, sacred buildings, rock paintings) are as a rule compared with other sites in the same “geocultural region” and must be outstanding in comparison with them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The maximum number of natural sites with o.u.v. is limited. The World Heritage List has finality in the area of natural heritage.</td>
<td>Since the evaluation of o.u.v. may be subject to change, there is no limit to the maximum number of cultural sites with o. u. v. The World Heritage List has no inevitable finality.</td>
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(*) o.u.v. = outstanding universal value
Developed by the author after analysis of texts by ICOMOS and IUCN, in particular WHC-06/30.COM/INF9 (2006).
for a broader public. According to the text of the Convention, the attestation of outstanding universal value (o. u. v.) is a necessary condition for the inscription of a site on the World Heritage List (UNESCO 1972, Art. 11,2). IUCN’s position, which is based on a rather naive kind of empirical realism, obviously regards outstanding universal value as an inherent quality of properties. ICOMOS’ official position can be classified as social constructivism. These different positions reflect not only the different subject areas of the advisory bodies (natural vs. cultural heritage), but also the different socializations of their members in different research cultures. In practice, however, representatives of ICOMOS seem to adopt a realistic position which can be seen in formulations such as “ICOMOS has no doubt about the site’s o. u. v.” These different approaches to the interpretation of key concepts, such as outstanding universal value, are apparently not detrimental to the success of World Heritage governance.

The objective of the World Heritage regime is to protect cultural and natural heritage sites of “outstanding universal value”. At the same time, the World Heritage List is a “metacultural production” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004); as a primarily non-intended side effect, the World Heritage regime produces a global canonization of the heritage of mankind. For the Greco-French philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis, attempting to establish a collective identity has always been a self-imposed task in every form of society (Castoriadis 1984; cf. also Bonacker 2008, 35). The implementation of the World Heritage Convention of 1972 is clearly seen as being part of an emerging world society’s attempt at self-affirmation and the establishment of a collective identity, even if this self-affirmation was not the original aim of the Convention. By identifying cultural “hotspots” and “deserts”, the World Heritage regime implicitly produces a global cultural geography, or at least two competing global cultural geographies: in UNESCO’s flagship publications, such as World Heritage, which cultivate the image of fascinating World Heritage Sites, an obvious effort is made to emphasize the geographical, cultural and ecological diversity of the sites represented on the list and thus of the planet Earth as a whole. However,
a global World Heritage map shows a quantitative domination of European sites. In figure 4, an official UNESCO map showing clearly that the majority of sites are in Europe, the map itself is framed by pictures that are mainly of non-European sites. The World Heritage Convention thus implicitly produces two different cultural geographies, one of planetary cultural diversity and the other of European cultural dominance. Now how can this European dominance in the metacultural production of World Heritage be explained? World Heritage is “produced” through the interplay of local, national and global actors and institutions. Europe’s quantitative dominance in respect of World Heritage Sites is at least partly a result of the different conditions of production on the national level. It reflects the greater resources available for the administration of culture in economically strong (and therefore European) countries (Fig. 5). It is easier for these countries to prepare nomination dossiers for the World Heritage List, which today have to meet very complex requirements. On the other hand, the European dominance can in part be explained by the Eurocentric cultural concept of the World Heritage List, which tends to attach most importance to architectural monuments (cf. Rossler 1995, 345). It is striking in this respect that a large number of sites outside Europe are connected with European colonial history.

Within UNESCO, in many of the (non-European) member states and in concrete in the debates of the World Heritage Committee, Europe’s quantitative dominance is perceived as a problem which needs to be corrected. It is also in opposition to the objectives and efforts of UNESCO to promote cultural diversity and a dialogue among civilizations. The Global Strategy for a Balanced, Representative and Credible World Heritage List, adopted in 1994, is aimed at increasing the number of nominations from developing countries, and implicitly at reducing those from European countries. Since 2006, the World Heritage Committee has applied a rule which serves this aim, limiting new nominations for the World Heritage List to a maximum of two per country in any one year (of which only one can be a “cultural” site) (cf. Operational Guidelines 2005, Art. 61). This restriction is an attempt to balance the better production conditions on the national level in European countries, and to contribute in the long term to a World Heritage map more in line with UNESCO’s values and principles. This regulation is thus an example of cultural governance par excellence.

The global institutions of World Heritage governance try to ensure that nominations by national states are not just left to chance and to the efforts of national actors; they seek to influence national decisions through the instruments of tentative lists and thematic studies, for instance by the advisory bodies (cf. ICOMOS 2005). Today a considerable number of newly inscribed cultural heritage sites cannot be classified using the traditional categories of high culture. An example from the 2006 session of the Committee is the inscription of Aapravasi Ghat in Mauritius, a site associated with
the beginning of the modern indentured-labour diaspora. Between 1834 and 1920, around 500,000 Indians arrived in the harbour of Port Louis to work as indentured labourers in the sugar plantations of Mauritius. However, the inscription of the site was not disputed within the global institutions of World Heritage governance: ICOMOS as the responsible advisory body proposed that the Committee should defer the nomination, mainly because of the lack of integrity and authenticity of the surviving buildings. ICOMOS also implicitly proposed that it would be better to look for other sites with more suitable buildings to serve as a monument to global indentured labour (ICOMOS 2006, 25–26). In the case of this nomination, it was particularly countries in the “South” (Madagascar, Kenya, Benin, Morocco, India, and Tunisia) that supported inscription of the site, and which in the end won the day. They argued among other things that the political and symbolic meaning of a site in memory of indentured labour (and indirectly of slavery) was the important factor. The leader of the Norwegian delegation, on the other hand, argued that “the site was of great importance”, but he “had the impression that the Convention (…) was not in focus” (WHC-06/30.COM/INF.19, 176). The inscription of the site despite its rather unspectacular buildings can be seen as a result of a desire to develop a global memory culture in respect of historical social distortions and to satisfy the need for representation of countries in the “South”. In this case, it can be said that the countries of the “South” won against those of the “North” – according to an interpretative scheme of the meeting (see below) – and against important financial backers of UNESCO. In the end, the Aaparavasi Ghat site benefited from the preceding hard discussions at the 2006 session on the World Heritage site of Tipasa, Algeria, which we will therefore examine in more detail in this paper. (Table 1)

4.3 A crucial event: the discussion in Vilnius in respect of Tipasa

The World Heritage site of Tipasa is located on the Mediterranean coast of Algeria, approximately 70 km west of Algiers. The central feature of the site is the remains of a Roman town, with buildings that were constructed mainly in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. The site of Tipasa was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1982; in 2002 it was inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, after a number of alleged problems were observed in spring 2002 by two officials sent by the UNESCO World Heritage Centre. The expert mission reported among other things “alarming acts of vandalism”, damage due to vegetation and erosion, illegally constructed houses, and general pressure of urban development from the neighbouring modern town (cf. WHC-06/30.COM/7A, 66). The Algerian ministry of culture has in the meantime implemented corrective measures to remedy these real or alleged problems. In March 2006, another mission was sent by UNESCO and ICOMOS to Tipasa at the request of the Committee. The report by this mission suggested that Tipasa could be removed from the “danger list”. The draft decision for the delegates in Vilnius on the other hand proposed that Tipasa should remain on the List of World Heritage in Danger, and demanded that the Algerian authorities should implement further measures and meet the agreed benchmarks, before Tipasa could be removed from the danger list.

In the approximately thirty years of work of the World Heritage Committee, the informal custom has become established (even if not always observed) that decisions concerning the World Heritage List and the World Heritage List in Danger should be arrived at by consensus if possible.

Right from the beginning of the discussion on Tipasa, however, it became clear that there were differences in the views of individual delegations which it would be difficult to resolve on a consensual basis. After a presentation by the World Heritage Centre and remarks by ICOMOS, with their negative votes, Morocco and Mauritius opened the discussion from the side of the Committee. They requested that Tipasa should be removed from the List of World Heritage in Danger, as desired by Algeria, arguing that Algeria had implemented corrective measures. This was opposed by Norway and the USA: they congratulated the Algerian government for its plans and for the measures carried out so far. But they asked if the Committee should make decisions purely on the basis of the government’s good intentions and of its success in meeting some, but not all, of the benchmarks. They argued that the Committee must be as consistent as possible in its decision-making. The delegate

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5) The citation of the speeches is based on my own handwritten notes which I compared with the official records of the meeting. Not all the aspects which I found relevant for my own interpretation were included in the official records, cf. WHC-06/30.COM/INF.19 (2006).
from Kenya later commented that the Committee members were present in order to discuss and make decisions. If it was only a matter of meeting benchmarks, they could communicate by e-mail and would not need to meet. The aim of the members was to help the site, and therefore he wished to plead that the site be taken off the List of World Heritage in Danger. If the situation did not improve, the site could always be reinscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger later on. The Indian delegate introduced another perspective into the discussion: in developing countries it is considered a stigma to have a site on the List of World Heritage in Danger, for this gives the impression that the ministry responsible is unable to protect its country’s cultural heritage. These are just a few typical arguments expressed during the discussion, which lasted for over 105 minutes and which at times took on the character of a tribunal, with Algeria as the accused party and ICOMOS as the expert consultant of the opposing party.

North-south divide or dash of intellectual styles?

In 2006 in Vilnius disputes arose over the question of whether the World Heritage site of Tipasa was in danger or not; in the opinion of observers and participants who had attended sessions of the Committee for many years, such disputes had never arisen before. The division was interpreted by at least some of the actors involved as a north-south confrontation that became endowed with its own reality through this conceptualization. The dividing line was emphasized discursively in the Committee by the leader of the Indian delegation, who spoke about the differences between developed and developing countries, marked India communicatively as a “southern country”, and opposed the southern countries, with their typical, common problems and approaches, to the northern countries.

But did the north-south division have a reality of its own beyond its discursive conceptualization? Indeed, most of the “northern” countries argued against the Algerian position, while the “southern” countries tended to support Algeria. In my interpretation, however, this confrontation was based less on a north-south divide than on a clash of different intellectual styles and approaches in the Committee. Even in the case of sites in the “North” (such as Cologne Cathedral), the delegates from developing countries in the “South” were generally more appreciative of the difficulties facing local and national authorities. And at least some of the “northern” delegations were more severe in their judgment of these cases. This observation does not fit with a simplistic interpretation of the division in the Committee as the expression of a north-south divide. On the other hand, the permanent reference to benchmarks by delegations from Anglo-Saxon countries and countries with similar research cultures (the USA and Canada, but also Norway and the Netherlands) inevitably recalled Galtung’s (1988 [orig.: 1966], 45) ideal-typical sketch of the essential features of Anglo-Saxon intellectual style. In an almost parodistic manner, Galtung quoted a typical question asked by Anglo-Saxon academics on hearing of a new thesis: How do you operationalize it? Even if World Heritage governance is basically organized in accordance with the homogenizing principles of “Western” (in a historical sense) modernity, it can still be the scene of clashes between different evaluation schemes and intellectual styles.

For Max Weber the ideal type is a mental construction which condenses and frequently exaggerates certain aspects of the “empirical world” (see for instance Müller 2007, 64-66). In this sense, we could oppose the ideal-typical figures of two delegates, one of whom pays rigorous attention to whether certain benchmarks and criteria are met, while the other wishes to solve all problems by agreeing with the national delegations, and in addition is prepared to attribute outstanding universal value to practically all newly proposed sites that have a favourable dossier, and to inscribe them without delay on the World Heritage List. However, the existence of divergent attitudes in the Committee in respect of implementing the concept of World Heritage, and even in respect of its basic philosophy, need not necessarily be detrimental to the success of the World Heritage Convention. On the contrary, it would be much worse for the inherent purpose of the World Heritage concept, if any one of these two ideal types were to become dominant in the Committee. Table 2 shows different positions and approaches that can be observed in the Committee. A constructive typology, but not an ideal type in Weber’s sense, is proposed by the loose attribution of delegations to these different positions.

4.4 Far-fetched facts: information flows in multilevel governance systems

The discussion on Tipasa clearly revealed a fundamental problem in World Heritage governance: the delegates have to make important decisions in respect of places which most of them have never
seen. An inspection of the locality, obligatory for many normal courts dealing with issues relating to the building regulations, would be practicable for the Committee only in very rare cases, due to the great distances involved and in view of the fact that something like a hundred World Heritage Sites and nominations have to be discussed at each session of the Committee. The delegates have to read the State of Conservation reports prepared by the advisory bodies and the World Heritage Centre, which are supplemented in the oral presentation by PowerPoint slides; in some cases, objections presented briefly by the national government, and in exceptional cases also by NGOs, paint a picture that contrasts with the description given by the advisory bodies and the World Heritage Centre. On the basis of these “weit hergeholte Fakten”, far-fetched facts (cf. ROTTENBURG 2002), the delegates have to arrive at a decision.

In the case of Tipasa, the delegates in Vilnius were given a four-page State of Conservation report prepared by ICOMOS. This report was based on the reports of two missions sent by UNESCO in 2002 and 2006. The overall situation in respect of the reports can be summed up as follows:

(1) The reports of the missions sent in 2002 and 2006, prepared by different experts from UNESCO and ICOMOS, gave different accounts of the situation in Tipasa, so divergent that the discrepancy could scarcely be explained by the different time of the missions only. This leads to the question as to which report can be considered as more credible, and in general the question as to how this enormous discrepancy can be explained.

(2) The State of Conservation report given to the delegates was a kind of synthesis of the two reports. But even where it reproduced the report of the 2006 mission, its style was noticeably more negative and it failed to mention a number of “exonerating” details contained in the 2006 report.

However, most of the delegates did not seem to be aware of this discrepancy, since they had obviously only seen the explicit State of Conservation report to the delegates, and not the report of the 2006 mission by BESCHAOUCH and BRAUN, which was not distributed automatically to the delegates, and which moreover was available only in French. The supposed north-south divide in the Committee in Vilnius was largely due to differences in the information received.
by the delegations, and perhaps also due to the lack of knowledge of French of some delegates.

The different messages conveyed by the report for the delegates and the report by the mission could basically be explained as an instance of the phenomenon which in terms of the communication process might be called the Chinese-whispers effect, after the old children’s game: if information is passed along a chain of stations without the sender being able to check whether the information is being passed on correctly, the message may undergo alteration, usually quite unconsciously, at each station and will have changed by the time it reaches the addressee. Awareness of this phenomenon is not new in the social sciences and communications, but the example of Tipasa shows that it has a bearing on the question of the seriousness of World Heritage governance.

If we read the Beschaouch and Braun (2006) report more carefully, the Committee’s benchmark discussion collapses like a house of cards in this concrete case. The benchmarks mentioned in the State of Conservation report for the delegates related explicitly to this report (“Benchmarks for corrective measures […] as defined by the reactive follow-up mission in March 2006”). Yet here, too, there were far-reaching modifications: where the expert report for instance only asks that a complete management plan be prepared, it is then demanded that a time schedule for preparing a management plan be presented (Beschaouch and Braun 2006, 13), the benchmarks in the report to the delegates require that a complete management plan be presented before Tipasa can be removed from the List of World Heritage in Danger. The delegates who, adopting the attitude of determined defenders of World Heritage, vehemently demanded that Tipasa should meet all benchmarks, were presumably not aware of these discrepancies. This episode raises the question of how suitable criteria (benchmarks, or other terms that have been preferred more recently such as ‘desired state of conservation’, ‘corrective measures’) are established within the framework of a complex multi-level governance system like the World Heritage regime.

This episode serves as an example of how difficulties can arise in World Heritage governance in respect of making decisions concerning distant places, when the local situation is not adequately represented to the decision-making Committee. The debate on Tipasa was selected for this reconstruction because its conflictive potential offered a good opportunity to analyse some of the mechanisms involved in global governance of World Heritage. It should not be considered as being typical of the way the World Heritage Committee works. I would certainly not wish to discredit the recent decisions of the Committee in respect of German sites (Cologne Cathedral, Dresden Elbe Valley), for instance, which in my opinion were well prepared.

4.5 The “political diplomacy” factor in sessions of the Committee and the global level of World Heritage governance

A commonly heard criticism of the World Heritage List is that decisions concerning the inscription of new sites are to a high degree politically motivated. The concept of “political” (unfortunately) has a rather pejorative connotation in this context. A political decision is implicitly understood as the opposite of a decision made according to “factual”, “scientific”, or perhaps even “objective” criteria, on the basis of expert reports, and as the result of a broad consensus, for instance among conservationists, archaeologists and ecologists.

The following attempt to investigate the role of political diplomacy in World Heritage governance is not intended to transport these negative connotations of the “political” factor. Through the World Heritage Convention, the protection of World Heritage is ensured by the cooperation of international institutions and national states. That questions of political diplomacy play a role in World Heritage governance is an inevitable consequence of this construction. For however “technical” international governance by regime may be, it is still political and therefore contested by definition (List 2007, 235).

“The policy of a country in the Committee depends on who is representing it, whether conservationists or diplomats”, is for instance the view of Hans Caspary, who represented the Federal Republic of Germany in the Committee as delegate or observer for almost two decades. However, it is also conceivable that stable patterns emerge in the long term, depending on the country in question, which will be reflected in the voting behaviour, interventions and public positions of its delegates, regardless of persons.

But what would be understood as extraneous political factors? We can speak of extraneous political influences when actors act in a way that is based neither on the needs of environmental and cultural conservation, nor on the ideal of communicative action (in the sense proposed by Habermas), nor on the ac-

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2) Conversation with Hans Caspary, July 2004 (from my own handwritten notes)
tors’ own personal interests. Such extraneous political influences might include efforts to raise national prestige, trying to please powerful states or countries with which “friendly relations” exist, or possibly trying to damage the reputation of enemies, however these may be defined. Are these the secret agendas of the World Heritage Committee? The above account suggests that this would be a very oversimplified view of the work of the Committee. The opposite view would be that the World Heritage Committee is wholly devoted to serving the interests of the global community and the conservation of cultural monuments and natural sites. Since there is no such thing as the perfect human institution, we can take as a provisional working hypothesis that a reasonable assessment lies somewhere in between.

Reciprocal expectations and claims of national states

At first glance, the discussion in the Committee on Tipasa appeared to be strongly influenced by such extraneous political considerations. For instance, it did not seem coincidental that Algeria’s two neighbours, Morocco and Tunisia, supported the position of the Algerian delegation. This shows on the one hand that existing international conflicts, here in respect of the Western Sahara, may be ignored in the UNESCO context, and that the delegations are prepared to act cooperatively. In this concrete case, however, the support given by Morocco and Tunisia could also be interpreted as an expression of their superior knowledge, as outlined above.

But what is the role generally played by diplomatic considerations in the Committee? During the 2006 session of the Committee, I was told the following by a delegate from a developing country: “I am expected to defend the other countries of the South and especially the countries [in our group] in the Committee. I defended the case of country A today, although – between you and me – I don’t think it is a good case. If I don’t do this, they will come to me afterwards and ask why didn’t you speak up. I don’t think the way countries are divided into groups is very helpful.” Such action by delegates, motivated by foreign relations and geopolitical considerations, and perhaps also by personal interests, is not restricted to developing countries, as demonstrated in 2006 by the committed and well-informed support of Spain for the nomination of the French Cevennes (which in the end was unsuccessful).

The delegates feel integrated at least to some extent in a network of mutual loyalties in respect of the interests of other countries. The work of the World Heritage Committee, which is aimed at the globally effective and scientifically-based protection of cultural and natural heritage, can nevertheless fulfil its objectives, as long as (a) at least some delegations succeed in evading the pressures exerted by such political loyalties, and (b) the loyalties are differently distributed. Delegates, who bow to these pressures in some cases, have relative freedom to act in other cases. Delegates with instructions from a lobby will as a rule not want to push that issue through at all costs when it is contested by other delegates, for they would otherwise risk losing their own standing in the Committee.

Another form of extraneous, but not undesirable, political influence is when the forum of the World Heritage Committee is used to send modest signals of reconciliation, in cases where the fronts in a conflict have become hardened. This can be said to have happened, for instance, when in the discussion on the nomination of two castles in Syria dating from the time of the crusaders, the delegate from Israel as first speaker expressed his full support for the nomination (see also WHC-06/30.COM/INF.19, 186).

4.6 Shaming and blaming and regime compliance: function and perceptions of the Danger List

The List of World Heritage in Danger is a key instrument in the World Heritage regime in order to improve compliance with regime norms by the States Parties. In the official UNESCO discourse, the List of World Heritage in Danger is an effective instrument for mobilizing and organizing national attention and action, as well as international support, for the protection of an endangered site (cf. UNESCO 1972, Art. 11). Delegates from various countries (in particular Norway and Canada) have several times articulated in the Committee a view of the List that conforms to this interpretation. But as shown by the discussion on Tipasa, the value of the List of World Heritage in Danger is a subject of dispute among the delegates in the Committee – and not only among the affected actors on the local level (see also SCHMITT and SCHWEITZER 2007). It must be taken into account that for many national delegations and ministries of culture it makes a considerable difference whether one of their sites is on the List of World Heritage in Danger or not. The labelling of a site as World Heritage in
Danger creates its own reality, and the effectiveness of this instrument is largely due to exactly this circumstance. Public blaming and shaming is a weak, but well established mechanism for achieving compliance in international regimes (cf. List 2007, 238).

The representatives of the Algerian government appeared to be personally unhappy about the course taken by the discussion on Tipasa in the Committee. For them it was an important political goal to get Tipasa taken off the List of World Heritage in Danger after six years. Due to its relative proximity to the capital, Tipasa is a kind of visiting card for the country; cultural programmes for foreign delegations often include a visit to Tipasa. This episode clearly shows the special, not unproblematic “sandwich” position of actors on the intermediary level of a global governance system: through their presence for many years in the arenas of the global level, they have to a large degree internalized the regime norms and aims, but at the same time their actions must take into account the interests of other actors, on both the national and local levels. In addition, even in a centralistic state like Algeria, the ability to “govern downwards” is not unlimited for national actors (for a general discussion, see List 2007, 232). Our reconstruction of the debate on Tipasa has made clear that the List of World Heritage in Danger is a sensitive instrument within the framework of World Heritage governance. In Vilnius, it was the leader of the Indian delegation who introduced into the discussion a pejorative view of the List of World Heritage in Danger, describing it as a stigma, and this attitude was then taken up by other delegations.

The following text was recorded following a conversation with a delegate from a developing country at the session of the World Heritage Committee in Vilnius:

From field journal (Vilnius 2006) – conversation with Delegate A:

The delegate told me that one of the tasks entrusted to him by his own government this time was to prevent Site A* from being inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger.

He said the local conservation manager (...) had told him that he wouldn’t mind if the Site were inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, since this would help to set things in motion, but the ministry wanted to prevent this.

I asked him about his personal opinion: surely inscription on the List of World Heritage in Danger needn’t necessarily be seen as a disgrace, as the Indian delegate had put it. The delegate answered: Yes, but in respect of Site A* things have already been set in motion (under pressure from UNESCO and its resolutions). Now the government has reacted, and so inscription of the site on the List of World Heritage in Danger should be prevented.

This text makes clear that inscription on a List of World Heritage in Danger definitely has negative connotations, so that the national ministry of culture is anxious to prevent one of its sites from being inscribed on the list. Inscription on this list would mean trouble for the national ministry, raise questions in the country, and affect the country’s international reputation. On the other hand, a fundamentally positive value is implicitly attributed to the existence of the instrument of the List of World Heritage in Danger in this concrete case. Just the threat that a site might be inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger was enough to “set things in motion”, in other words to make the government follow a more resolute policy to protect the site. When the site had reached a point that was, so to speak, just below inscription on the List of World Heritage in Danger, this was a situation which, at least in this concrete case, permitted the national cultural bureaucracy and the local conservation managers to exert pressure on other local and regional actors to take active measures to protect the site. Such a mechanism can work as long as national and/or local actors are willing to recognize the moral authority, or at least the potential power to exert pressure, of UNESCO and the World Heritage Committee, as representatives of the international community.

Apart from deletion of a site from the World Heritage List (which brings to an end the special relation between the site and UNESCO), inscription on the World Heritage List in Danger is the most severe measure that can be taken in order to achieve regime compliance by national and local authorities. Different interpretations of the severity of blaming and shaming influence perceptions of this instrument on the part of national authorities and delegates in the Committee.

5 Conclusions: cultural governance of World Heritage

The World Heritage regime is a mayor example for the multi-level governance of cultural artefacts and the metacultural production of a global offer for identification in an emerging World Society. The
The governance of World Heritage and the metacultural production are both conducted by scientific and political considerations and reflect different conditions, possibilities and constraints on the local, national, and global governance scale. If we consider the global scale, we can distinguish an “everyday” and a “mid-term” or “long-term” governance by the World Heritage regime, including modifications to its key concepts.

The “everyday” governance is mainly concerned with updating the World Heritage List and the List of World Heritage in Danger and with interventions in respect of the management of World Heritage Sites. This area of World Heritage governance is regulated by the text of the Convention (UNESCO 1972) and the current OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES (2005). On this level, the World Heritage Committee seems to have undisputed sovereign power. But on a closer look, it is obvious that the global scale of World Heritage is governed by a system of checks and balances between the Committee, the UNESCO administration and the advisory bodies. The Committee does not always have to follow their advice, but according to the unwritten rules of the governance system, the Committee should not snub the advisory bodies unduly. According to its formal and informal rules, the global level of World Heritage is constituted neither as an expertocracy nor as unrestricted rule by diplomats. Unlike in the classical concept of the separation of powers, there is no judicative instance or instance for appeal against decisions made by the Committee.

While the World Heritage List is a universal global production based on the artefacts of different cultural traditions, the global governance of World Heritage shows that different intellectual styles play a remarkable role in the negotiations of the Committee as an institution of an emerging world society. The specific, strongly regulated setting of the World Heritage Committee, in accordance with an international diplomatic culture, impedes the constructive management of conflicts as in the case of the debate on Tipasa. In order to resolve conflicts à la Tipasa constructively, the Committee would need a further decision-making mode in which the normal restrictions do not apply and in which one thing above all would be available: time. Time for detailed presentation of arguments, for hearing all parties, for reading and studying original documents (not just condensed State of Conservation reports), original plans and collections of photographs (and not just a didactic selection of PowerPoint slides), perhaps even for discussions in small groups.

The above-mentioned long-term developments in World Heritage governance include the decision made in 1992 to introduce cultural landscapes among the UNESCO World Heritage categories, and the greater importance attached to trans-border sites (such as the Roman Limes) or transnational theme routes. Their inclusion represents a fusing of classical ideas on the protection of cultural and natural heritage with the founding principle of UNESCO to promote international understanding via culture. In all these developments, too, the formal sovereign control of the World Heritage Committee remains unaffected – at least as long as the General Assembly of States Parties, which has even greater international legitimacy, does not claim competence over these matters. Notwithstanding the formal sovereignty of both bodies, ideas in this field are developed in open cooperation between the UNESCO administration, the advisory bodies, the Committee and the General Assembly, and in some cases other cooperation partners, such as “site managers” at different World Heritage Sites or national experts.

Within this long-term perspective of global World Heritage governance, the UNESCO administration and the advisory bodies have a considerable influence, in part due to their greater staff continuity, while the members of the Committee are regularly replaced. In these cases the procedures of negotiation and concept development are thus much more open, and not processually determined.

The concept of outstanding universal value has undergone implicit modifications in its more than thirty years of existence, as a result of the need to respect the List’s claim of serving the world society. The List now includes not only “classical” high culture or archaeological sites, but also an increasing number of sites connected with “indigenous” cultures, twentieth century architecture, the history of technology, disasters of civilization (such as Auschwitz concentration camp), and finally sites of global social history. Such long-term developments change the sense and meaning of outstanding universal value, and of the canon of material artefacts of a global memory culture; they follow general global discourses and reinforce such trends with the power of UNESCO as a gentle hegemon. In the relevant decision-making bodies, such developments are not always undisputed, as seen in the discussion on Aappravasi Ghat. At the same time the establishment of the World Heritage regime points to the existence of an idealistic moment in international politics in the postulation of a common cultural and natural heritage of mankind.
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